Kernel extensions in macOS
Starting with macOS 11, if third-party kernel extensions (kexts) are enabled, they can’t be loaded into the kernel on demand. Instead, they’re merged into an Auxiliary Kernel Collection (AuxKC), which is loaded during the boot process. For a Mac with Apple silicon, the measurement of the AuxKC is signed into the LocalPolicy (for previous hardware, the AuxKC resided on the data volume). Rebuilding the AuxKC requires the user’s approval and restarting of the macOS to load the changes into the kernel, and it requires that the secure boot be configured to Reduced Security.
Important: Kexts are no longer recommended for macOS. Kexts risk the integrity and reliability of the operating system, and Apple recommends users select solutions that don’t require extending the kernel.
Kernel extensions in a Mac with Apple silicon
Kexts must be explicitly enabled for a Mac with Apple silicon by holding the power button at startup to enter into One True Recovery (1TR) mode, then downgrading to Reduced Security and checking the box to enable kernel extensions. This action also requires entering an administrator password to authorize the downgrade. The combination of the 1TR and password requirement makes it difficult for software-only attackers starting from within macOS to inject kexts into macOS, which they can then exploit to gain kernel privileges.
After a user authorizes kexts to load, the above User-Approved Kernel Extension Loading flow is used to authorize the installation of kexts. The authorization used for the above flow is also used to capture an SHA384 hash of the user-authorized kext list (UAKL) in the LocalPolicy. The kernel management daemon (
kmd) is then responsible for validating only those kexts found in the UAKL for inclusion into the AuxKC.
If System Integrity Protection (SIP) is enabled, the signature of each kext is verified before being included in the AuxKC.
If SIP is disabled, the kext signature isn’t enforced.
This approach allows Permissive Security flows for developers or users who aren’t part of the Apple Developer Program to test kexts before they are signed.
After the AuxKC is created, its measurement is sent to the Secure Enclave to be signed and included in an Image4 data structure that can be evaluated by iBoot at startup. As part of the AuxKC construction, a kext receipt is also generated. This receipt contains the list of kexts that were actually included in the AuxKC, because the set could be a subset of the UAKL if banned kexts were encountered. An SHA384 hash of the AuxKC Image4 data structure and the kext receipt are included in the LocalPolicy. The AuxKC Image4 hash is used for extra verification by iBoot at startup to help ensure that it isn’t possible to start up an older Secure Enclave–signed AuxKC Image4 file with a newer LocalPolicy. The kext receipt is used by subsystems such as Apple Pay to determine whether there are any kexts currently loaded that could interfere with the trustworthiness of macOS. If there are, then Apple Pay capabilities may be disabled.
Alternatives to kexts (macOS 10.15 or later)
macOS 10.15 enables developers to extend the capabilities of macOS by installing and managing system extensions that run in user space rather than at the kernel level. By running in user space, system extensions increase the stability and security of macOS. Even though kexts inherently have full access to the entire operating system, extensions running in user space are granted only the privileges necessary to perform their specified function.
Developers can use frameworks, including DriverKit, EndpointSecurity, and NetworkExtension, to write USB and human interface drivers, endpoint security tools (like data loss prevention or other endpoint agents), and VPN and network tools, all without needing to write kexts. Third-party security agents should be used only if they take advantage of these APIs or have a robust road map to transition to them and away from kernel extensions.
User-Approved Kernel Extension Loading
To improve security, user consent is required to load kernel extensions installed with or after installing macOS 10.13. This process is known as User-Approved Kernel Extension Loading. Administrator authorization is required to approve a kernel extension. Kernel extensions don’t require authorization if they:
Were installed on a Mac when running macOS 10.12 or earlier
Are replacing previously approved extensions
Are allowed to load without user consent by using the
spctlcommand-line tool available when a Mac was booted from recoveryOS
Are allowed to load using mobile device management (MDM) configuration
Starting with macOS 10.13.2, users can use MDM to specify a list of kernel extensions that load without user consent. This option requires a Mac running macOS 10.13.2 that’s enrolled in MDM—through Apple School Manager, Apple Business Manager, or user-approved MDM enrollment.