Apple Platform Security
- Welcome
- Intro to Apple platform security
-
- System security overview
- Signed system volume security
- Secure software updates
- Background Security Improvements
- Operating system integrity
- BlastDoor for Messages and IDS
- Lockdown Mode security
- System security for watchOS
- Random number generation
- Communicating emergency information using satellites
- Apple Security Research Device
-
- Services security overview
-
- Apple Pay security overview
- Apple Pay component security
- How Apple Pay keeps users’ purchases protected
- Payment authorization with Apple Pay
- Paying with cards using Apple Pay
- Contactless passes in Apple Pay
- Rendering cards unusable with Apple Pay
- Apple Card security
- Apple Cash security
- Tap to Pay on iPhone
- Secure Apple Messages for Business
- FaceTime security
- SharePlay security
- Nearby sharing security
- Glossary
- Document revision history
- Copyright and trademarks

SharePlay security
SharePlay is built on top of the end-to-end encrypted infrastructure of FaceTime, so the data exchanged between participants during a SharePlay activity is protected such that no one but the participants can access it. Apple can’t decrypt the data.
SharePlay uses the Apple Push Notification service (APNs) for signaling, reusing the same push channel FaceTime establishes between registered devices, and traffic is carried over the same end-to-end encrypted data channel used by FaceTime. The key material protecting SharePlay activity traffic is re-established when the call’s membership changes, so that newly added members can’t decrypt earlier traffic and removed members and unable to decrypt subsequent traffic. Unlike the session keys protecting Group FaceTime media, SharePlay keys aren’t rotated temporally and persist for the duration of the activity.
To keep concurrent or sequential activities on the same call cryptographically isolated, SharePlay never uses this key material directly. Each activity instead derives its own key by diversifying the shared key material with the activity’s unique identifier, so apps using SharePlay can’t decrypt one another’s traffic. Starting a new activity produces a new identifier and therefore a different key. Participant identifiers are similarly diversified per activity, so one activity can’t correlate its participants with those of another app, even when the underlying FaceTime membership is identical.