Apple Platform Security
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Welcome
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Introduction
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Services security overview
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Apple Pay overview
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Apple Pay components
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Secure Element and NFC controller
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Payment authorization
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Transaction-specific dynamic security code
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Pay with credit and debit cards in stores
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Pay with credit and debit cards within apps
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Paying with credit and debit cards on the web
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Contactless passes
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Render cards unusable
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Suspending, removing, and erasing cards
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Apple Cash
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Transit cards
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Credit and debit cards for transit
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Student ID cards
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Business Chat
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FaceTime
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Developer Kits overview
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HomeKit identity
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Communication with HomeKit accessories
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Local data storage
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Data synchronization between devices and users
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Home data and apps
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HomeKit and Siri
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HomeKit IP cameras
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HomeKit routers
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iCloud remote access for HomeKit accessories
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HomeKit TV Remote accessories
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Apple TV profiles for HomeKit homes
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CloudKit
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SiriKit
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DriverKit
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Camera and ARKit
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Secure device management overview
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Pairing model
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Passcode and password settings management
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Configuration enforcement
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Mobile device management (MDM)
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Automated Device Enrollment
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Apple Configurator 2
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Device supervision
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Device restrictions
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Activation Lock
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Lost Mode, remote wipe, and remote lock
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Screen Time
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Glossary
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Document Revision History
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Copyright

Boot process of Mac computers without an Apple T2 Security Chip
Mac computers without an Apple T2 Security Chip don’t support secure boot. Therefore the UEFI firmware loads the macOS booter (boot.efi) from the filesystem without verification, and the booter loads the kernel (prelinkedkernel) from the filesystem without verification. To protect the integrity of the boot chain, users should enable all of the following security mechanisms:
System Integrity Protection: Enabled by default, this protects the booter and kernel against malicious writes from within a running macOS.
FileVault: This can be enabled in two ways: by the user or by a mobile device management (MDM) administrator. This protects against a physically present attacker using Target Disk Mode to overwrite the booter.
Firmware Password: This can be enabled in two ways: by the user or by a mobile device management (MDM) administrator. This protects a physically present attacker from launching alternate boot modes such as recoveryOS, Single User Mode, or Target Disk Mode from which the booter can be overwritten. This also prevents booting from alternate media, by which an attacker could run code to overwrite the booter.
